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Summary
Early visual areas contain specific information about visual
items maintained in working memory, suggesting a role for
early visual cortex in more complex cognitive functions [1–
4]. It is an open question, however, whether these areas
also underlie the ability to internally generate images de
novo (i.e., mental imagery). Research on mental imagery
has to this point focused mostly on whether mental images
activate early sensory areas, with mixed results [5–7].
Recent studies suggest that multivariate pattern analysis
of neural activity patterns in visual regions can reveal con-
tent-specific representations during cognitive processes,
even though overall activation levels are low [1–4]. Here,
we used this approach [8, 9] to study item-specific activity
patterns in early visual areas (V1–V3) when these items are
internally generated. We could reliably decode stimulus
identity from neural activity patterns in early visual cortex
during both working memory and mental imagery. Crucially,
these activity patterns resembled those evoked by bottom-
up visual stimulation, suggesting that mental images are
indeed ‘‘perception-like’’ in nature. These findings suggest
that the visual cortex serves as a dynamic ‘‘blackboard’’
[10, 11] that is used during both bottom-up stimulus pro-
cessing and top-down internal generation of mental content.
Results
Here we investigated whether early sensory regions are re-
cruited similarly during the maintenance of previously pre-
sented images (i.e., visual workingmemory [1, 12]), the internal
generation of images that have not been presented (i.e.,
mental imagery [13]), and the perception of visual material
[14–17]. We used a multivariate analysis approach [8, 9] to
determine the information contained in the spatial patterns of
fMRI responses. Participants (N = 24) either kept a grating
stimulus in mind (working memory [WM] trials) or internally
generated a new stimulus by mentally rotating a grating and
subsequently held this new image in their mind’s eye for a
10 s period (imagery [IM] trials; see Figure 1). Crucially, during
the IM task, the image kept inmind was not a representation of
the physically presented grating but was generated de novo by
mentally transforming the stimulus material. Behavioral data
confirmed that the participants could successfully perform
both tasks, with increasing reaction times as a function of
the amount of mental transformation (see Figure S1 available*Correspondence: floris.delange@donders.ru.nlonline). We defined early visual cortical areas (V1, V2, and
V3) using standard retinotopicmapping routines and extracted
activity patterns in these regions as the mental imagery pro-
cess unfolded.
First, we assessedwhether the activity pattern in early visual
cortex during the working memory period in WM trials
reflected the stimulus orientation (three possibilities: 15,
75, 135) that was maintained by the participants, using a
WM-trained classifier and a leave-one-run-out cross-valida-
tion approach. We found that early visual cortex (V1–V3)
indeed contained information about maintained content
[WM: decoding accuracy 54%, chance level 33.3%: t(23) =
5.88, p < 1 3 1025] in the period 8–12 s after onset of mainte-
nance). This increase is comparable in size to that observed
in earlier studies [1], reflects a medium-to-large effect size
(Cohen’s d = 1.21) [18], and replicates the finding that early vi-
sual cortex contains memory representations in the absence
of stimulus input [1–4]. To investigate whether the same voxels
in early visual cortex also contained information about images
that were internally generated and subsequently maintained,
we repeated this procedure with an IM-trained classifier
applied to IM trials. Indeed, early visual cortex also contained
information about internally generated images [IM: decoding
accuracy 46%, t(23) = 3.09, p = 0.005, Cohen’s d = 0.63],
indicating involvement of the visual cortex during mental
imagery. Moreover, activity patterns for WM and IM trials
were highly similar: when training themultivariate pattern clas-
sifier on the delay period during WM and testing on the delay
period during IM, we found equally reliable pattern information
[WM/IM decoding accuracy 45%, t(23) = 3.88, p < 1 3 1023,
Cohen’s d = 0.78]. Training on IM and testing on WM also re-
sulted in reliable classification [IM/WM decoding accuracy
45%, t(23) = 4.13, p < 1 3 1023, Cohen’s d = 0.83]. All of these
effects were also present when we looked at V1, V2, and V3
separately (Table S1; all accuracies > 39%, all p < 0.007).
The similarity between neural representations during WM
and IM does not necessarily mean that these representations
are ‘‘perceptual’’ in nature (i.e., resemble the bottom-up activ-
ity patterns evoked during actual perception), because bot-
tom-up and top-down signals could be encoded differently
in early visual cortex [19, 20], or the patterns could reflect
some other aspect of the task, such as attention. To test the
perceptual nature of these representations, we obtained activ-
ity patterns during the actual perception of gratings and
trained a classifier to discriminate the orientation of these grat-
ings. Since participants performed a task at fixation during the
perception of the gratings, these activity patterns chiefly re-
flected bottom-up, stimulus-related activity, while the poten-
tial effects of top-down attentional processes were reduced
by providing subjects with a task at fixation. This ‘‘perceptual’’
classifier could also reliably discriminate between activity pat-
terns in early visual cortex evoked by the different orientations
during both WM trials [decoding accuracy 46%, t(23) = 4.50,
p < 1 3 1024, Cohen’s d = 0.90] and IM trials [decoding accu-
racy 49%, t(23) = 5.92 p < 1 3 1025, Cohen’s d = 1.21]. This
indicates that not only does the early visual cortex contain in-
formation about internally generated images during IM, the ac-
tivity patterns for these images are similar to those evoked
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Figure 1. Experimental Design
At the start of each trial, a task cue indicated whether participants had to maintain a stimulus in working memory (WM; top row) or create a new stimulus by
imagining rotating the stimulus grating and keeping the ensuing mental image in their mind’s eye (mental imagery [IM]; bottom row). During IM trials, mental
rotation could be clockwise or counterclockwise (as indicated by arrow direction), and 60 or 120 (as indicated by the number of arrows). After the task cue,
two gratings (out of three possible stimuli: 15, 75, or 115) were presented briefly, followed by a second stimulus cue (A or B, denoting the first or second
stimulus, respectively) that indicated which stimulus grating to select and maintain (WM) or rotate and then imagine (IM). After a 10 s delay period in which
participants were asked to vividly imagine the relevant stimulus, a probe was presented. Participants indicated whether the probe was rotated clockwise or
counterclockwise with respect to the stimulus they had kept in mind and received feedback on each trial. See also Figure S1.
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1428during actual perception. Interestingly, decoding accuracy
was higher for people who could more accurately form mental
images during both tasks (WM: r = 20.51, p = 0.0053; IM: r =
20.37, p = 0.039; Figure S2), providing a strong link between
mental imagery ability and the precision of population-level re-
sponses [21, 22].
The generalization of the content-specific patterns between
bottom-up stimulation and top-down internal generation sug-
gests that similar neural codes are used during these pro-
cesses in early sensory cortex. To examine the time course
of this process and assess whether early visual cortex sequen-
tially represents the initial and final target image (cf. [23]), we
analyzed activity patterns in early visual cortex at each time
point as the task unfolded, using the independent classifier
that was trained on stimulus-driven activity. During WM trials,
the classifier was initially at chance, selecting each option
approximately one-third of the time. After stimulus presenta-
tion, visual cortical (V1–V3) activity patterns reflected a combi-
nation of the two presented gratings. Subsequently, the cued
(i.e., to be remembered) grating was predominantly selected
by the classifier (Figure 2A). Similarly, during IM trials, initial vi-
sual cortical activity patterns after stimulus presentation re-
flected the two presented gratings, but not the unpresented
grating (Figures 2B and 2C). Again, shortly after this, the
cued (i.e., starting orientation that had to be mentally rotated)
grating was predominantly selected by the classifier. Crucially,
however, there was a gradual shift from a representation of thecued (starting) grating toward a representation of the internally
generated target grating. This target gratingwas not physically
presented on that trial but was mentally created by the partic-
ipants and after several seconds became the preferred orien-
tation of the classifier. This suggests three sequential stages of
representation in early visual cortex during themental imagery
process: first, the physically presented stimuli are repre-
sented; second, one of the presented stimuli is selected for
transformation; and third, a new representation is formed in
early visual cortex.
The time courses of decoding accuracy for the target grating
further support this notion (Figure 3A). During WM, the target
could be decoded as early as 4 s after delay-period onset,
whereas during IM the target could only be decoded from 8 s
after delay-period onset. This delay likely reflects a combina-
tion of factors. During imagery trials, participants had to not
only select the cued grating but also retrieve the task cue,
which instructed them about the direction and extent ofmental
rotation. They subsequently had to perform the mental rota-
tion, with each of these steps contributing to the delay in the
formation of the internally generated target image. The pat-
terns in Figures 2 and 3 suggest that participants mentally
transformed the image early in the trial, rather than at the
time of the probe. Again, similar patterns were present in V1–
V3 in isolation.
There was a dissociation between the time course of stim-
ulus representation and the time course ofmean neural activity
AB
C
Figure 2. Temporal Unfolding of Mental Representations
Proportion of classifier choice when testing V1–V3 combined (360 voxels),
averaged over the 24 participants. Error bars denote SEM; dashed line indi-
cates chance level (33.3%).
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1429in the early visual regions (Figure 3B). While information about
maintained (WM) or internally generated (IM) stimuli increased
over the delay interval, overall neural activity decreased, in line
with previous work on visual working memory [1]. This
stresses the difference between overall activation and infor-
mation content within activation patterns and puts the results
of previous studies that looked only at overall activity levels of
sensory cortex during mental imagery in a new perspective.
Although early sensory areas did not show robust delay-
related activity, there were several other areas outside visual
cortex that showed a robust and sustained neural activity in-
crease during the delay period of both IM and WM trials (Fig-
ure S3; Table S2), including bilateral parietal and prefrontal
cortex, as well as the pre-supplementary motor area. To inves-
tigate whether these areas also contained stimulus-related in-
formation, we used the same classification approach that we
employed for early visual areas. Interestingly, although some
of these regions within this network (notably the left parietal
cortex and supplementarymotor area) showed some evidence
of stimulus information when training and testing within the
main experiment (Table S2), generalization from the percep-
tual classifier to the main task resulted in chance-level perfor-
mance (all p > 0.05).
Discussion
In this study, we used amultivariate pattern analysis approach
to directly compare neural representations during visual
perception, working memory and mental imagery, in retino-
topically defined early visual cortex.We found that activity pat-
terns in early visual areas (V1–V3) could reliably predict which
of three oriented gratings was either held in working memory
or mentally imagined, even though overall levels of neural ac-
tivity were low. We observed similar neural activity patterns
during periods in which participants either kept visual material
in working memory (WM) or internally generated a visual stim-
ulus (IM) bymentally transforming it, as shown by similarly high
decoding performance within and between tasks. Crucially, by
training on patterns of activity during physical presentation of
gratings, we show that activity patterns during mental imagery
resemble those elicited by physically presented stimuli, sug-
gesting analogous neural codes for internally generated
mental images and stimulus representations. The results are
in line with other recent findings of representational content
in the visual cortex during high-level cognitive processes [1,
24, 25].
Together, our results suggest that early visual areas may
serve as a dynamic ‘‘blackboard’’ that supports information(A) Classifier choice over time during WM trials. Activity patterns during the
first time point (2 s afterWMonset) show amixture of the two physically pre-
sented stimuli (red and pink lines), but not unseen grating, after which the
pattern activity was consistently classified as the cued grating (pink line).
(B) Classifier choice over time during IM trials. On these trials, participants
mentally rotated the cued stimulus toward the not-physically-presented
grating orientation. Again, activity patterns during the first time point (2 s af-
ter IM onset) show amixture of the two physically presented stimuli (red and
pink lines), while the not-presented grating is the least selected. Thereafter,
there is a gradual switch in classifier choice from the cued grating (pink) to
the generated target grating (blue).
(C) Classifier choice over time during IM trials. On these trials, participants
mentally rotated the cued stimulus toward the presented but uncued grating
orientation. A transition in the representation occurred w8 s after delay
period onset, from the cued grating (pink line) to the created grating that
was similar to the presented but uncued grating (red line).
See also Figure S2 and Table S1.
AB
Figure 3. Time Course of Decoding Accuracy and Mean Neural Activity in
V1–V3
(A) Time course of decoding accuracy was different for WM (black line) and
IM (red line). Accurate decoding of the target image was achieved several
seconds later in time for IM than for WM trials, due to the intermediate
mental operation. Decoding was significant from 4 to 16 s for WM trials
and from 8 to 16 s for IM trials (all p < 0.001). Error bars denote SEM, dashed
line indicates chance level (33.3%), and asterisks indicate significant decod-
ing accuracy (p < 0.001) for WM (black) and IM (red) or a significant differ-
ence between the two (gray).
(B) Time course of mean neural activity was indistinguishable between WM
(black) and IM (red), as indicated by average blood oxygen level-dependent
amplitude time course (averaged over the 360 selected voxels) with respect
to average activity immediately preceding trial onset. Neural activity peaked
w4 s after presentation of the stimuli and againw4 s after presentation of
the probe, while activity declined in the delay period between the two pre-
sentations. Error bars denote SEM.
See also Figure S3 and Table S2.
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[10, 23, 26]. This fits with proposals that view the primary visual
cortex not simply as an entry station for subsequent cortical
computations in higher-order visual areas but rather as a
high-resolution buffer in the visual system that is recruited
for several visual computations [11, 24, 26].These findings also speak to an age-old debate about the
nature of mental content [13, 16]. Depictive theories of mental
content stress the overlap between representations during
perception and mental imagery. Studies that assessed
whether mental images activate primary sensory areas, as
proposed by ‘‘depictive’’ theorists, have provided mixed
results [5–7, 27]. By showing that there is content-specific
overlap of activation patterns during mental imagery and bot-
tom-up visual stimulation in primary visual cortex, we show
that mental imagery partly depends on the same mechanisms
as visual perception, in line with depictive accounts of mental
representations [20].
An open issue relates to the role of nonsensory areas in the
maintenance and internal generation of sensory material.
Although we observed strong increases in activity in a specific
set of regions in prefrontal and parietal cortex [28], we and
others [3] did not find reliable encoding of stimulus-related in-
formation in these areas when training on perceptual input.
This suggests that although it is very possible that these nonvi-
sual areas contain stimulus representations, their format ap-
pears distinct from the automatic, bottom-up representation
evoked by visual stimulation. Studies using neural recordings
in monkeys have observed coding of individual stimuli in pre-
frontal cortex [29] and content-specific synchronization of ac-
tivity across the frontal parietal network [30] during visual
working memory. Interestingly, we also obtained evidence
for some stimulus-related information in parietal and frontal re-
gions when comparing stimulus-specific patterns within the
main tasks (IM andWM). Together, these results suggest com-
plementary roles for early visual cortex and frontoparietal re-
gions [30–32], whereby frontoparietal regions create flexible
stimulus representations that are in line with behavioral goals
[3, 33]. However, the exact role and representational content
of the frontoparietal regions during mental imagery remain to
be determined.
The generalization of stimulus information from stimulus-
driven activity patterns to mental imagery-induced activity
patterns in early visual cortex suggests a common representa-
tion of bottom-up and top-down signals in these cortical areas.
It should be noted here that generalization was robust but not
perfect, which may be due to the fact that internally generated
images can lead to less robust and more variable activation
patterns than bottom-up visual stimulation, due to internal
fluctuations in attentional state. These fluctuations are likely
reduced during the perceptual localizer, although it is also
possible here that subjects still paid some attention to the
stimuli (even though they performed a task at fixation). The
current task design makes it unlikely that eye movements
contributed to the decoding of imagined orientations. First,
we trained the classifier on the independent localizer, during
which participants had to perform a task at fixation. Second,
the stimulus gratings were presented very briefly (200 ms),
too short for systematic eye movement preparation and
execution. Additionally, the relevant grating was only cued af-
ter the stimulus presentation [1].
It may seem surprising that overall neural activity levels ap-
peared low during mental imagery and working memory, even
though the patterns in early visual cortex carried stimulus in-
formation during this period. One reason for this may be that
visual areas also exhibit an overall high level of spontaneous
activity during rest [34], the functional significance of which
may be quite similar to mental imagery [35]. Indeed, a recent
developmental study [36] showed that spontaneous fluctua-
tions in visual regions become increasingly similar to
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1431stimulus-evoked patterns, suggesting that activity patterns in
visual cortex may constitute an internal model that continu-
ously adapts to expected upcoming input. Evidence for such
an internal, predictivemodel of the world in early visual regions
has also been obtained recently in humans [37]. Building on
this, mental imagery might entail the generation of such an in-
ternal model, with top-down biasing signals projecting to vi-
sual areas in order to sharpen upcoming perception, leading
to a similar overall level of activation in visual regions during
imagery and rest. The idea that mental imagery plays a func-
tional role in facilitating future perception is supported by a
recent study that found that mental imagery biases subse-
quent perception in a binocular rivalry task [35, 38], as well
as by the correlation between IM performance and representa-
tional precision (Figure S2).
In conclusion, we observed analogous sensory representa-
tions during visualworkingmemory andmental imagery in early
visual cortex. Crucially, these activity patterns resembled those
evokedbybottom-upvisual stimulation, suggesting thatmental
images are ‘‘perception-like’’ in nature. These findings provide
empirical support for the notion that visual cortex acts as a
blackboard that is used during both bottom-up stimulus pro-
cessing and top-down internal generation of mental content.
Experimental Procedures
The experimental procedures are summarized briefly throughout the Re-
sults and are presented in complete detail in the Supplemental Experimental
Procedures.
Supplemental Information
Supplemental Information includes three figures, two tables, and Supple-
mental Experimental Procedures and can be found with this article online
at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2013.05.065.
Acknowledgments
This study was supported by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific
Research (NWO Brain & Cognition 433-09-248).
Received: February 22, 2013
Revised: May 10, 2013
Accepted: May 31, 2013
Published: July 18, 2013
References
1. Harrison, S.A., and Tong, F. (2009). Decoding reveals the contents of vi-
sual working memory in early visual areas. Nature 458, 632–635.
2. Christophel, T.B., Hebart, M.N., and Haynes, J.D. (2012). Decoding the
contents of visual short-term memory from human visual and parietal
cortex. J. Neurosci. 32, 12983–12989.
3. Riggall, A.C., and Postle, B.R. (2012). The relationship between working
memory storage and elevated activity asmeasuredwith functionalmag-
netic resonance imaging. J. Neurosci. 32, 12990–12998.
4. Serences, J.T., Ester, E.F., Vogel, E.K., and Awh, E. (2009). Stimulus-
specific delay activity in human primary visual cortex. Psychol. Sci.
20, 207–214.
5. Klein, I.,Paradis,A.-L.,Poline,J.-B.,Kosslyn,S.M., andLeBihan,D. (2000).
Transientactivity in thehumancalcarinecortexduringvisual-mental imag-
ery: an event-related fMRI study. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 12(Suppl 2 ), 15–23.
6. Knauff, M., Kassubek, J., Mulack, T., and Greenlee, M.W. (2000).
Cortical activation evoked by visual mental imagery as measured by
fMRI. Neuroreport 11, 3957–3962.
7. Kaas, A., Weigelt, S., Roebroeck, A., Kohler, A., and Muckli, L. (2010).
Imagery of a moving object: the role of occipital cortex and human
MT/V5+. Neuroimage 49, 794–804.
8. Haynes, J.-D., and Rees, G. (2006). Decoding mental states from brain
activity in humans. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 7, 523–534.9. Kamitani, Y., and Tong, F. (2005). Decoding the visual and subjective
contents of the human brain. Nat. Neurosci. 8, 679–685.
10. Bullier, J. (2001). Feedback connections and conscious vision. Trends
Cogn. Sci. 5, 369–370.
11. Mumford, D. (1991). On the computational architecture of the neocortex.
I. The role of the thalamo-cortical loop. Biol. Cybern. 65, 135–145.
12. Baddeley, A. (2003). Working memory: looking back and looking for-
ward. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 4, 829–839.
13. Kosslyn, S.M., Thompson, W.L., and Ganis, G. (2006). The Case for
Mental Imagery, Volume 39 (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
14. Kosslyn, S.M., Ganis, G., and Thompson, W.L. (2001). Neural founda-
tions of imagery. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 2, 635–642.
15. Slotnick, S.D., Thompson, W.L., and Kosslyn, S.M. (2005). Visual mental
imagery induces retinotopically organized activation of early visual
areas. Cereb. Cortex 15, 1570–1583.
16. Pylyshyn, Z.W. (2003). Return of the mental image: are there really pic-
tures in the brain? Trends Cogn. Sci. 7, 113–118.
17. Pylyshyn, Z.W. (2002). Mental imagery: in search of a theory. Behav.
Brain Sci. 25, 157–182, discussion 182–237.
18. Friston, K. (2012). Ten ironic rules for non-statistical reviewers.
Neuroimage 61, 1300–1310.
19. Stokes,M., Thompson, R., Cusack, R., andDuncan, J. (2009). Top-down
activation of shape-specific population codes in visual cortex during
mental imagery. J. Neurosci. 29, 1565–1572.
20. Lee, S.-H., Kravitz, D.J., and Baker, C.I. (2012). Disentangling visual im-
agery and perception of real-world objects. Neuroimage 59, 4064–4073.
21. Emrich, S.M., Riggall, A.C., Larocque, J.J., and Postle, B.R. (2013).
Distributed patterns of activity in sensory cortex reflect the precision
of multiple items maintained in visual short-term memory. J. Neurosci.
33, 6516–6523.
22. Ester, E.F., Anderson, D.E., Serences, J.T., and Awh, E. (2013). A neural
measure of precision in visual working memory. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 25,
754–761.
23. Moro, S.I., Tolboom, M., Khayat, P.S., and Roelfsema, P.R. (2010).
Neuronal activity in the visual cortex reveals the temporal order of
cognitive operations. J. Neurosci. 30, 16293–16303.
24. Pasternak, T., and Greenlee, M.W. (2005). Working memory in primate
sensory systems. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 6, 97–107.
25. Horikawa, T., Tamaki, M., Miyawaki, Y., and Kamitani, Y. (2013). Neural
decoding of visual imagery during sleep. Science 340, 639–642.
26. Lee, T.S., andMumford, D. (2003). Hierarchical Bayesian inference in the
visual cortex. J. Opt. Soc. Am. A Opt. Image Sci. Vis. 20, 1434–1448.
27. Kosslyn, S.M., and Thompson, W.L. (2003). When is early visual cortex
activated during visual mental imagery? Psychol. Bull. 129, 723–746.
28. Duncan, J. (2010). The multiple-demand (MD) system of the primate
brain: mental programs for intelligent behaviour. Trends Cogn. Sci. 14,
172–179.
29. Rainer, G., Rao, S.C., and Miller, E.K. (1999). Prospective coding for ob-
jects in primate prefrontal cortex. J. Neurosci. 19, 5493–5505.
30. Salazar, R.F., Dotson, N.M., Bressler, S.L., and Gray, C.M. (2012).
Content-specific fronto-parietal synchronization during visual working
memory. Science 338, 1097–1100.
31. Miller, E.K., and Cohen, J.D. (2001). An integrative theory of prefrontal
cortex function. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 24, 167–202.
32. Ridderinkhof, K.R., Ullsperger, M., Crone, E.A., and Nieuwenhuis, S.
(2004). The role of the medial frontal cortex in cognitive control.
Science 306, 443–447.
33. C¸ukur, T., Nishimoto, S., Huth, A.G., and Gallant, J.L. (2013). Attention
during natural vision warps semantic representation across the human
brain. Nat. Neurosci. 16, 763–770.
34. Kenet, T., Bibitchkov, D., Tsodyks, M., Grinvald, A., and Arieli, A. (2003).
Spontaneously emerging cortical representations of visual attributes.
Nature 425, 954–956.
35. Kosslyn, S.M., Thompson, W.L., Kim, I.J., and Alpert, N.M. (1995).
Topographical representations of mental images in primary visual cor-
tex. Nature 378, 496–498.
36. Berkes, P., Orba´n, G., Lengyel, M., and Fiser, J. (2011). Spontaneous
cortical activity reveals hallmarks of an optimal internal model of the
environment. Science 331, 83–87.
37. Kok, P., Jehee, J.F., and de Lange, F.P. (2012). Less is more: expecta-
tion sharpens representations in the primary visual cortex. Neuron 75,
265–270.
38. Pearson, J., Clifford, C.W., and Tong, F. (2008). The functional impact of
mental imagery on conscious perception. Curr. Biol. 18, 982–986.
